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Chapter I 
Introduction 
 
The debate about the economic impact of multinational firms on host countries 
was centered on whether foreign direct investment (FDI) was beneficial to host country 
or not. The pro FDI arguments grew largely out of the traditional neo-classical and new 
economic growth theory. The opposite foreign investment arguments came from two 
basic arguments: one more strictly economic and the other more philosophical or 
ideological.  
Traditional Economic Arguments argued that foreign private investment was 
typically seen as a way of filling in gaps between the domestically available supplies of 
savings, foreign exchange, government revenue, and human capital skills and the desired 
level of these resources necessary to achieve growth, and development targets. The first 
contribution of foreign private investment to national development (i.e., when the 
development is defined in terms of GDP growth rates) was its role in filling in the 
resource gap between targeted or desired investment and locally mobilized savings. A 
second contribution, analogous to the first, was its contribution to filling in the gap 
between targeted foreign-exchange requirements and those derived from net export 
earnings plus net public foreign aid (this is the so-called foreign-exchange or trade gap). 
Third the gap between targeted governmental tax revenues and locally raised taxes could 
be filled by foreign investment. Fourth the operation of foreign private investment in the 
local market presumed could fill in the gap in management, entrepreneurship, technology, 
and skill. (Todaro, 1997, p.538) 
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In contrast, the contra arguments argued: first, although foreign private 
investment provide capital, they might lower domestic savings and investment rates by 
stifling competition through exclusive production agreements with host governments, 
failing to reinvest much of other profits, generating domestic incomes for groups with 
lower savings propensities, inhibiting the expansion of indigenous firms that might 
supply them with intermediate products by instead importing these goods from overseas 
affiliates, and imposing high interest costs on capital borrowed by host governments. 
Second, although the initial MNC investment was to improve the foreign exchange 
position of recipient nation, in the long run it can reduce foreign exchange earnings on 
both current and capital accounts. In the long run, when the company starts to proceed a 
profit, investors will transfer their earning to their home country. Furthermore this 
transfer earning will reduce foreign exchange earnings on both current and capital 
accounts. Third, although MNCs do contribute to public revenue in the form of corporate 
taxes, their contribution can be considerably less than it should be as a result of liberal tax 
concessions, the practice of transfer pricing, excessive investment allowances, disguised 
public subsidies, and tariff protection provided by the host government. Fourth, the 
management, entrepreneurial skills, ideas, technology, and overseas contacts provided by 
MNCs might have little impact on developing local sources of these scarce skills and 
resources and may in fact inhibit their development by stifling the growth of indigenous 
entrepreneurship as a result of the MNCs dominance of local markets. (Todaro, 1997, 
p.538) 
Indonesia has long believed that foreign private investment was economically 
beneficial to host country. In 1967, when president Soeharto took power from president 
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Soekarno, he directly changed the orientation of the economy from centralized economy 
toward liberal economy1. Despite the initial liberal action policies FDI showed significant 
growth only after 1986. Policies toward FDI could be broken into four periods. The first 
liberalization policies were 1967 to 1973, which aimed to correct the economic policies 
of the previous government. The second policies were 1974 to 1986, which categorized 
protectionist policies. These policies have implemented in response to increased 
nationalist reactions to FDI. The third period was marked by the second liberalization 
policies, from 1986 to 1997, as an effect of the fall in oil price. The fall in oil prices 
forced the government to restructure the economy, away from its dependence on oil 
revenues. The fourth period was the third liberalization policies, after the 1997 crisis, 
which was the continuation of the second liberalization policies 1986 -1997. 
Since the onset of 1997 currency crisis, Indonesia has given more attention to FDI. 
This was because the government desires to foster economic recovery by way of 
attracting FDI. In the short run FDI was expected to solve lack of capital, absorb 
unemployment, extend the market price systems and the private sector and mitigate the 
external debt problem in Indonesia.  
When a country suffers a resource or savings gap (an internal macro imbalance 
between national expenditure and national saving), it would also confront a foreign 
exchange gap that has to be balanced with an inflow of foreign capital2. In macro 
economic terms, when government expenditure plus private investment exceed 
government revenue and private savings (a resource gap), this internal imbalance would 
spill over into a current account deficit and hence create foreign exchange gap. 
                                                 
1 See the detail, Indonesia: the critical role of government, Donald J. lecraw, 1998, page 322. 
2 See the detail in page 215 (Gerald M. Meier, 1995) 
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International financial intermediation was then required to fill in the foreign exchange 
gap. Moreover this gap could be covered by loans from multilateral lending agencies and 
commercial banks, or by foreign investment. For a developing country, the sources of 
external financing were foreign aid from government to government, cross border 
sovereign lending by commercial banks, loans from the World Bank, access to the 
country’s drawing rights in the IMF and private foreign investment (FDI and portfolio 
investment). While the four sources of foreign capital declined, FDI had strong potential.  
Against such a background, this paper plans to investigate the empirical 
relationship between FDI and GDP growth in Indonesia. Is FDI economically beneficial 
to Indonesian economic since long time ago (how much contribution of FDI to GDP 
growth)? Before we undertake econometric analyses on the impact of FDI to GDP 
growth, we first examine factors that determine FDI in Indonesia.  
This study uses historical and quantitative research methods. The historical 
overview of FDI policies and trend of investment looks at such important as various 
government policies and institution designed to foster private investment.  
The statistical analysis section comprises two models on FDI: a model of 
determinants of FDI and a model of impact FDI on GDP Growth. The empirical work in 
this study is based on time series data.  
The organization of the paper is as follows. Chapter II will provide a historical 
overview of FDI policy in Indonesia. Chapter III will discuss some trends of FDI inflow 
to Indonesia. The empirical estimation of FDI determinants and the impact of FDI toward  
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GDP growth is provided in section IV. Concluding remarks are presented in the final 
section. The appendices contain, among other things, a detailed description of the 
regression results.  
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Chapter II 
Historical Overview Toward FDI Policies in Indonesia 
 
In order to investigate the role of foreign direct investment in Indonesia’s 
economic development, it was helpful to review the government’s policy on FDI. This 
policies could be discussed under four periods, namely, the first liberalization policies, 
1967 to 1973; the protectionist policies, 1974 to 1986; the second liberalization policies, 
1986 to 1997; and the third liberalization policies, after the 1997 crisis.  
 
The First Liberalization Policies, 1967 to 1973 
Upon assuming after overtaking a power in 1966 President Soeharto tried to 
restore macroeconomic stability and changed the orientation of the economy from state-
owned enterprises and direct government intervention towards more reliance on the 
market. The new government also made substantial changes in the trade and investment 
regimes. As part of these initiatives, the government established more sympathetic 
policies towards private investment in general and foreign investment in particular. 
Some policies towards foreign investment were first taken in 1967 as follows: 
first the government established a new law concerning with foreign investment, law 
number 1 of 1967 on foreign investment4. Second, government returned some 
nationalized enterprises to the previous owners5 (article 21, Law No 1/1967). Third, 
                                                 
4 The detail of Law No.1/ 1967, see Country profile of Indonesia: Exchange Control, Foreign Investment 
Legislations 
5 In the era of Soekarno many foreign companies had been nationalized. In 1957 Dutch investment were 
nationalized; in 1963 British and Malaysian assets were nationalized; and in 1965 some American and 
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government created the Foreign Capital Investment Advisory Board (Badan 
Pertimbangan Penanaman Modal Asing, BPPMA, 1967). The Board’s main task was to 
give advice to the president with respect to the implementation of foreign investment. 
Fourth, government allowed 100 percent foreign ownership and no restriction anymore 
on foreign equity and employment of expatriates (Hadi Soesastro, p. 4). Dr Sadli, a 
government minister, characterized Indonesia’s condition toward FDI during that period: 
(Dunning, 1996, p.323 quoted from Palmer, 1979, p.100). 
 
“When we started out attracting foreign investment in 1967 everything and 
everyone was welcome. We did not dare to refuse: we did not even dare to ask 
for bonafidity of credentials. We needed a list of names and dollars figures of 
intended investments to give credence top our drive”  
                     (Palmer, 1979) 
 
The only limitation on foreign equity ownership was that foreign investment 
licenses were only given for a period of thirty years. After thirty years, the foreign 
investors should transfer its shares to an Indonesian investor; otherwise the company 
would be liquidated. The regulations also establish a minimum investment limit of $1 
million for foreign investment projects. The rationale behind this regulation was 
government realizes that the primary benefit of MNEs was their access to large fund of 
capital that Indonesian investors did not hold. Thus, the government was willing that 
                                                                                                                                                 
other foreign assets were nationalized. For more detail see Donald J. Lecraw, Indonesia: the critical role of 
government, 1998.   
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foreign investors should undertake bigger investment projects and domestic investors 
could undertake smaller investment projects6. 
Even though Law No. 1/1967 was liberal for FDI in selected sectors, in some 
sectors government still restricted to foreign companies. The motivations for closing 
these sectors were security sectors (e.g. explosives and atomic generation plants), 
strategic sectors (e.g. transportation, the media, and telecommunications) and public 
services (e.g. electricity generation and distribution, water supply). The mining 
agricultural and fisheries sectors were also closed to FDI (sources BKPM). These sectors 
were closed because they run on Article 33 (2) of the 1945 Constitution (branches of 
production which are important for state and affect the welfare of the people at large will 
be undertaken by the state) and article 33 (3) (water and natural resources are owned by 
the state and should be used to benefit all the people). As a result of Law No. 1/1967, 
twenty-two PMA projects were approved in 1967. By 1970, 177 PMA projects had been 
approved, in which thirty-seven were 100 percent foreign owned projects (BKPM).  
In general, based on analysis data statistic, the government decision to rehabilitate 
an economy by opening the domestic market for foreign investment was quite successful. 
Growth was restored,  inflation was brought down, private initiatives were promoted and 
foreign capital plus aid were coming back. As a result, GDP was growth stable in turn 7 
percent; inflation dropted to below two digits and number of foreign direct investment 
has increased significantly more than three times, 22 projects in 1967 to 69 projects in 
19747.  
                                                 
6 The detail see article 18, law No. 1/1967 
7  This analysis based on data statistic provided by BKPM and IMF, International Financial Statistics 
Yearbook 
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The Protectionist Policies, 1974 to 1986 
The oil boom and the higher commodity price brought Indonesia in the new era of 
foreign investment policies. Higher energy prices provided the government with 
substantial revenues and relaxed the balance of trade and payments problems that had 
placed restraints on its development efforts. In January 1974, after violent demonstrations 
during the visit of Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka and also because of increasing 
nationalist reactions to foreign direct investment, the government made significant 
change in Indonesia’s FDI system. In addition, since the government started to implement 
liberal policies on FDI, Japan became the major investor in Indonesia. (detail see chapter 
III). In January 22, 1974, the government set the standard for principles governing 
foreign investment that all new foreign investments should be in the form of joint 
ventures; Indonesian equity in these investments would be increased at least a 51 percent 
majority share holding within a certain period of time, in 1975 defined as ten years; the 
number of sector closed to foreign investment was increased; tax incentives were 
reduced; and number of foreign personnel permitted to work at each foreign owned 
company was reduced (Donald J. Lecraw, p. 324; Hadi Soesastro, p. 4). 
At the same time where these changes were being made in the FDI system, 
growing controls were instituted on all private investment and the financial system, in the 
form of investment licensing and credit allocation. The government also used oil revenue 
to expand the role of state owned enterprises. Public enterprises began to take a dominant 
role in a number of sectors and public investments were increasingly directed into heavy 
industries, petrochemicals and mining. These changes in government policy both towards 
the private sector as a whole and towards FDI demonstrate a recurring theme in 
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government economic policy in Indonesia. After foreign exchange and capital restraints 
had been reduced, the government increased the public sector roles and decreased the role 
of the private sectors and FDI. 
During this period an increasing number of sectors were closed to foreign 
investment (e.g. new weaving mills located on Java). The new investment regulations 
gave possibility to add sectors that were closed for foreign investment. The next few 
years, in accordance with this regulation, growing number of sectors were deemed to be 
closed to foreign investors based on a number of criteria: 1) Domestic entrepreneurs were 
considered capable to undertake the activity; 2) the activity was targeted by state 
enterprises because of its strategic nature; 3) the activity was targeted for small 
entrepreneurs. (Donald J. Lecraw, p. 324; Hadi Soesastro, p. 4)   
The falling of oil revenue, in 1975-1976, combined with the Pertamina Crisis, led 
to deteriorate Indonesia’s investment climate and exacerbated its external debt situation. 
To improve the investment climate, the government  simplified and facilitated the foreign 
investment approval process. The government also implemented existing restrictions on 
foreign investment less forcefully. The administrative improvements introduced in 1977, 
including the establishment of  the BKPM as a one-stop service and the introduction of  a 
Priority Investment List (Daftar Skala Prioritas, DSP, BKPM, 1977). The government 
used the annual Priority Investment List as a main instrument to regulate the sectoral 
composition of investment for the private sector in general and MNEs in particular. The 
DSP list covered all economic activities except oil, gas and the financial sector. The first 
DSP list was very detailed; 831 sectors in one of the four categories. (BKPM)   
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However, the DSP list still had exceptions. Foreign companies could invest in 
activities that were closed to foreign investment. Furthermore both foreign and domestic 
investors could also invest in sectors that were closed to all investment under certain 
conditions related to the development objectives of the government. The rationales 
underlying these exceptions were: regional distribution, located outside Java; exports, 
100 percent of production exported; employment creation. These exceptions illustrate 
how the government relaxed regulation for MNEs if they could provide additional 
benefits (beyond capital) to the Indonesian economy. 
The second oil price increase in 1978-1979 again relaxed Indonesian foreign 
exchange constraints accelerated economic growth and increased government budged 
revenues. As a direct consequence, the government again instituted additional restrictions 
on foreign investment. In 1981, the government required foreign-owned companies to 
transfer 51 percent of their ownership to Indonesian shareholders within ten years 
(BKPM). Furthermore, the government appeared to move to implement the phase down 
requirements. The government stated that for foreign companies approved prior to 
February 1974, a minimum of 30 percent of their equity had to be transferred to 
Indonesian shareholders by the end of 1984. Also, at this time the government introduced 
a requirement that, at the time of formation, there would be a minimum 20 percent 
Indonesian shareholding for all foreign companies. Starting in 1980, the government 
closed an increasing number of sectors for foreign investment. The 1981 DSP list kept 
additional sectors for cooperatives. 
Starting from 1982, Indonesia experienced external shocks in the form of falling 
oil and other commodity prices. Between 1982 and 1985 the government introduced 
12 
measures to stabilize the macro economy; introduced some structural reforms to mobilize 
resources (e.g. tax and financial reforms); and made improvements in customs, ports and 
shipping. In this case, the government’s trade and industrial policies became more inward 
oriented and interventionist. Against this background, the government also increased the 
restrictive nature of its foreign investment policies. 
 In the second stage period policies, based on data statistic, we could say that 
government failed to uphold friendly investment climate. The changes in government 
policy both towards the private sector as a whole and towards FDI demonstrated a 
chronic theme in government economic policy in Indonesia. The protectionist policies 
and government controls had adverse effect on the competitiveness of domestic market, 
creating a high-cost economy. As a result inflation stayed above two digits; GDP sharply 
fluctuated only 2.2 percent in 1982; and the number of FDI suffered a four-fold Decline 
in 19798.  
 
The Second Liberalization Policies, 1986-1996 
In 1986, the economy again suffered a series of external shocks due to a sharp fall 
in oil prices and the appreciation of the yen (a substantial portion of Indonesia’s external 
debt was dominated in yen). These actions led to 34 percent deterioration in Indonesia’s 
term of trade and an increase in the debt service ratio from 26 percent in 1985 to 37 
percent in 1986. In response to this condition the government again undertook 
macroeconomic stabilization procedures (fiscal strictness and devaluation) as well as 
                                                 
8 This analysis based on data statistic provided by BKPM and IMF, International Financial Statistics 
Yearbook 
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substantial real and financial sector reforms. In the field of foreign investment policy, the 
government initiated gradual policies to liberalize all aspects of the FDI system. 
The liberalization of both the economy as a whole and the foreign investment 
system in particular was connected to the government’s policies to promote non-oil 
exports and to encourage participation of the private sector in the economy. As in the past, 
under the pressure of falling economic growth, strained international credit, and the need 
for both investment capital and foreign exchange, the government turned once again 
towards the private sector and foreign investors by relaxing regulations on private and 
foreign investors. 
In May 1986 the government reduced the 20 percent minimum requirement for 
Indonesian ownership to 5 percent for high risk investment: those located in remote areas 
(i.e. mostly in eastern Indonesia); those involved in high technology; those that were 
export oriented (i.e. at least 85 percent of their production); or investments requiring a 
large amount of capital (i.e. project costs above $10 million). The phase-down 
requirements for such projects were: to 20 percent Indonesian ownership within five 
years and to 51 per cent Indonesian ownership within ten years as under the previous 
regulation (In 1981, the government reiterated the requirement that foreign-owned 
companies were to transfer 51 per cent of their ownership to Indonesian shareholders 
within ten years). The government relaxed the requirement for foreign investors to phase 
down their equity ownership to 49 percent over a ten-year period under certain conditions. 
The government also confirmed that the licenses of joint ventures were suitable for thirty 
years and could be extended another thirty years if the firm increased its capital in order 
to expand or diversify their output. (BKPM) 
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In the 1986 DSP list, the number of business activities, open to foreign investment 
increased from 475 to 926. In the industrial sector government also increased activities 
for foreign investment from 253 to 596 (BKPM). The government’s opening the number 
of sectors investment to foreign companies reflected a major change in their policy focus: 
from one in which large sectors of the economy were reserved for domestic companies to 
one in which greater emphasis was placed to attract foreign investment come to these 
sectors. 
In December 1987, the government again relaxed foreign investment restrictions. 
The minimum Indonesian ownership was lowered to 5 percent for foreign companies, 
which exported 100 percent of their production without further obligation to phase down 
their share. The general phase down requirement to 51 per cent was also extended to 
fifteen years. Moreover, foreign owned companies with a minimum capital of $10 
million; or located in one of the provinces in Eastern Indonesia; or exporting at least 65 
percent of their production also could be formed with a 5 percent minimum Indonesian 
shareholding. Unlike the 100 percent export oriented foreign companies, however, there 
was a phase-down requirement to 20 percent within ten years and 51 percent within 
fifteen years for these companies.  
In May 1989 the DSP list was replaced with a Negative List. In principle, any 
sector not on the Negative List was open for foreign companies. By this change the 
government could effectively further opened additional activities to foreign investment. 
The original Negative List had sixty-four sectors closed to foreign investment, although 
some of these sectors open under certain conditions, such as for export-oriented 
investments. In 1989, the government introduced deregulation packages that lowered the 
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minimum capital investment required for foreign companies from $1 million to $250,000 
if the project were labor intensive (i.e. employed more than fifty workers), export 
oriented, or supported small industries, which did not compete with existing industries. 
In October 1989, the government also liberalized foreign ownership restrictions, 
although only in certain areas: 100 percent foreign ownership was allowed in the Batam 
Economic Zone with 5 percent divestment to Indonesian shareholders within five years. 
For this type of investment, there was no further requirement for divestment, if the 
foreign company exported 100 percent of their products. 
In 1991, rapid growth and the resulting accelerating inflation and the increasing 
current account deficit led the government to establish macro-stabilization measures of 
tight monetary policies, as well as to impose limits on foreign borrowing by state-related 
entities. At that time Japan changed its major investment destiny to china. Furthermore 
the decline in the general investment climate in Indonesia led to a percieved decline in 
foreign investor interest. As a result, the government introduced two important policy 
reforms in 1992-1993. 
A significant initiative came in the government’s 1992 decree, whereby the 
government allowed 100 percent foreign ownership for certain types of investments: 
investments of over $50 million, investments located in Eastern Indonesia, and 
investment located in a bonded zone if all production were exported. For these types of 
investments, phase down from a maximum 100 percent foreign ownership was required. 
The other changes introduced by the government where foreign investment in labor 
intensive operations (defined as those employing more than fifty persons), export-
oriented projects (defined as projects exporting 65 percent of production) and supplier 
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industries producing raw materials or intermediate goods, the minimum Indonesian 
shareholding at the time of investment was set at 5 percent with a phase down to 10 
percent in ten years and 51 percent in twenty from the start of commercial production. 
The lower minimum investment also applied to foreign investment in the services sector, 
but with 20 percent minimum Indonesian shareholding formation and phase down to 51 
percent in twenty years. 
The October 1993 package was notable for two reasons. On the one hand, that 
package continued the past trend towards liberalization on FDI system by allowing initial 
foreign ownership of 100 percent for investments with amount over $2 million in supplier 
industries. Conversely, the liberalization of the phase-down requirements of the 1992 
package were taken back for investments with amount over $50 million, those located in 
Eastern Indonesia, and those in bonded zones: phase down had at least 51 percent 
Indonesian ownership instead of 20 percent. 
In June 1994, the government announced a dramatic FDI liberalization package 
phase down regulations were removed; FDI with up to 100 percent foreign ownership 
was permitted in a wide range of sectors; the minimum capital requirements were 
eliminated; and nine public interest sectors port, production, transmission and distribution 
of electricity, telecommunications, shipping, air transportation, drinking water, railways, 
atomic generating plants, and mass media which had previously been closed to FDI were 
opened to majority, but not 100 percent foreign ownership. 
Other policies which were important for improving the FDI in Indonesia were as 
follows. First, the Indonesian government has agreed to submit any investment disputes 
to the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in 
17 
Washington D.C. In 1993, a long-pending investment dispute involving a U.S investor 
was resolved throughout ICSID. Second, under Government Regulation No. 45 of 1996, 
the government has re-introduced basic tax holidays. According to Regulation 45, 
specific sectors, including capital goods manufacturing, agribusiness, infrastructure, sea 
and air transport, engineering, and professional personnel training may be qualified for 
tax holidays.  
The second liberalization undertaken in response to the significant drop in oil 
revenue was quite successful to attract foreign direct investment. Trade liberalization 
package of October 1986, and 1994; a dramatic liberalization package of June 1994 to 
increase the attractiveness of Indonesia’s investment regulation due to increased 
competition for investment from China, Vietnam and other countries in the region. Out of 
those years, 1986 and 1994, the deregulation on FDI did not significantly increase FDI 
inflows9. Iqbal (1995) described that from 1991 to about the middle of 1994 the country 
experienced a “reform fatigue” or a policy inertia (Hill, 1997). In addition, the increasing 
of FDI in Indonesia started from 1986, beside the domestic factors (government policies), 
also because of the external factors (globalization). According to Dunning (1993), the 
most sticking development that has affected government attitudes and policies toward 
MNEs since the 1980’s has been the globalization of the world economy. Such 
globalization was shown by tremendous growth of all forms of international transaction 
especially related to MNEs activities. In addition, the number of foreign direct investment 
                                                 
9 FDI increase drastically after deregulation 1986 and 1994, in other years FDI was stable, detail see the 
FDI development, BKPM  
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in the second period of liberalization has increased significantly more than ten times from 
1986 to 1996 and GDP was stable in the level 6-7 percent10.  
 
The Third Liberalization Policies, after the 1997 crisis 
Since the onsets of the economic crisis in mid-1997, the value of FDI in Indonesia 
fell more than two times, 33832.5 in 1997 to 13563.1 in 1998 (see table 1). Troubles such 
as political uncertainty, upcoming political and fiscal decentralization, uneven 
implementation of economic reform commitments, the unreliable judicial system, 
security issues, and treatment of existing investors has pushed foreign investors to stay 
away from Indonesia. To overcome these problems the Indonesian government was 
encouraging a more active promotion of FDI.  
The Capital Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM/BKPMD) played an 
important role in promoting foreign investment and approving project applications. As an 
investment board, BKPM functioned as a one-stop investor service. Investors that have 
approval from BKPM no longer need approval from a provincial governor or regional 
chief. Another significant change was that master lists of capital goods and basic material 
imports for both foreign and domestic investments were approved by BKPM/BKPMD 
and no longer need clearance from the Directorate General of Customs and Excise.  
In approval process, the Indonesian government also simplified the approval 
process. For example, approvals for foreign investment up to $100 million need no longer  
to be approved by the president of Indonesia, but only by the Chairman of BKPM. On the 
domestic side, approval of investments of to US$1.2 million might be issued by the 
                                                 
10 This analysis based on data statistic provided by BKPM and IMF, International Financial Statistics 
Yearbook 
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Chairman of the regional BKPM office rather than by headquarters in Jakarta. A recent 
Ministerial decree gave authority to Indonesian embassies and consulates abroad to 
accept applications for foreign investment, which would then be forwarded to BKPM for 
final approval. (Indonesia: Investment climate statement 2000)  
Following the deregulation above, in June 1998, the government of Indonesia 
eliminated many FDI restrictions in retail and wholesale markets with the condition that 
they enter into a cooperative agreement with a small enterprise. In addition, many foreign 
firms used franchising, licensing, and technical service agreements to distribute their 
goods. Under current regulations, foreign companies manufacturing in Indonesia might 
distribute their locally produced goods at the wholesale level and might apply for permits 
to import and distribute other products as well. However, companies engaging in 
wholesale distribution may not conduct retail operations directly, but should form a 
separate retail company. Further, the number of expatriate employees granted visas to 
work in any single wholesale and retail business remains limited. 
The government also made some revision in some sectors restricted previously. 
Sectors such as harbors, electricity generation, telecommunications, shipping airlines, 
railways, and water supply were revised. Recently government developed policies on the 
private provision of infrastructure through build-own-operate and build operate-transfer 
schemes, particularly for electric power, telecommunications and roads. Full foreign 
ownership was not permitted in these sectors. Local partners were required to own 
anywhere from five to 51 percent of these investments. Even the government has reduced 
a negative list of restricted sectors; however, there were some certain sectors remain 
restricted for foreign investment. Sectors that remain closed to foreign investment are, 
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among others, freshwater fishing, forestry, public transportation, broadcasting and film, 
and medical clinics. 
In order to give more guarantees to foreign investors in January 2000, Indonesia 
has made bilateral investment agreements with other countries. In addition, Indonesia has 
signed investment agreements with 52 countries, namely the United States (Agreement 
on Investment Guarantees), Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Chile, People’s republic of China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Hungry, United 
Kingdom, Italy, India, Jamaica, Germany, Jordan, Cambodia, South Korea, Cuba, 
Kyrgyz Stan, Laos, Malaysia, Morocco, Mauritius, Mozambique, Egypt, Mongolia, 
Norway, Pakistan, France, Poland, Romania, Singapore, Slovak republic, Spain, Sri 
Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syria, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. In the case of 
double taxation, Indonesia also has signed treaties for the avoidance of double taxation 
with 50 countries. (United Nations, Bilateral Investment Treaties, 2000)  
 In addition, the economic crisis accompanying  such domestic problems, political 
and social dispute, has fallen foreign investment interest in Indonesia substantially. 
Eventhough many deregulations have been created by the government, if the business 
environment, as well as general political and economic environment did not support the 
government policies, the deregulation has no meaning. So, besides being committed to 
deregulation the government should consider stable political environment too. 
Bureaucratic procedures, corruption, and legal reform are also important factors in 
determining foreign investment development. Klaus Peter Kriegsmann from Asian 
Development Bank, observed that investors had lost confidence in Indonesia. He 
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emphasized the need for legal and judicial reform and strengthening of the capital 
markets and the banking system. He considered corporate governance reform to be the 
core building renewed investors confidence to make investment in Indonesia (World 
Bank, Corporate Governance Workshop, February 19, 2002). In the same occasion, I 
Nyoman Tjager, Chairman of the National Committee for Corporate Governance, also 
said that invertors were concerned about transparency and disclosure concerning the use 
of their funds by borrowers, and the accountability of the borrower for performance and 
fair distribution of profits. If Indonesia and Indonesian companies want to attract 
international investors, there is a need to meet investors requirements such as 
transparancy and disclosure. Unfortunately, this is not as easy as it sounds, most investors 
still consider doing business in Indonesia as too costly and risky (World Bank, Corporate 
Governance Workshop, February 19, 2002). In addition, the 1997 crisis has caused total 
value of investment decreased significantly, more than three times. GDP growths also 
decrease significantly, even in 1998 reached –13.1 percent11.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 This analysis based on data statistic provided by BKPM and IMF, International Financial Statistics 
Yearbook 
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Chapter III 
Trends of FDI in Indonesia 
 
Because of a lack of data source for analysis trends of FDI, data were started to be 
used in 1978 (data available from 1967 only total FDI). This caused the problem that 
there was no overview from the moment when the investment law No. 1/1967 was 
introduced. But in general, in the initial period FDI enter into Indonesia showed no 
significant change. FDI showed a significant change after the government introduced 
deregulation packages in May 6, 1986, called Pakem/Pakmei (see table 1). In those years, 
FDI  increased almost 9 times compared to the previous year. Furthermore, in analyzing 
trends of FDI in Indonesia, this analysis was comprised in three parts: foreign investment 
by economic sector, foreign investment by countries origin and foreign investment by 
location. 
Table 1. Table of application approval since 1967 
The FDI Development in Range 1967-2000 
Year 
Number of 
Project 
Value (in 
millions US$) Year 
Number of 
Project 
Value (in 
millions US$) 
1967 22 207.1 1984 23 1096.9 
1968 35 264.4 1985 45 853.2 
1969 37 127.5 1986 93 847.6 
1970 83 166.8 1987 130 1520.3 
1971 62 287.2 1988 145 4410.7 
1972 47 163 1989 294 4713.5 
1973 69 323.8 1990 432 8751.1 
1974 53 542.4 1991 376 8778 
1975 24 1145 1992 305 10323.2 
1976 22 221 1993 329 8144.2 
1977 20 167 1994 451 27353.3 
1978 23 207.1 1995 799 39944.7 
1979 13 248.6 1996 959 29928.5 
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1980 20 1074.4 1997 790 33832.5 
1981 24 706.5 1998 1035 13563.1 
1982 31 2416.9 1999 1164 10890.6 
1983 46 2470.8 2000 1433 14933.6 
Total 631 10739.5 Total 8803 219885 
Sources BKPM 
 
Foreign Investment by Economic Sector 
The category investment by economic sector has nine subcategories: agriculture 
(including forestry and fishing), mining and quarrying, manufacturing, construction, gas, 
water and electricity, financing (including insurance, real estate, business services), 
community, social and personal services, wholesale, retail trade, restaurants and hotels, 
and transportation (including storage, communication). Of these nine categories, the 
leading categories were manufacturing; gas, water and electricity and transportation. In 
these three sectors, the total foreign investment respectively was 141079 million US 
dollar, 17976.4 million US dollar and 14823.1 million US dollar from 1978 to December 
2000. In the manufacturing sector the average was 5878.3 million US dollar per year, 
about 749 million US dollar in the gas sector and 617.6 million US dollar per year in 
transportation. With a share of more than 65%, it was obvious that manufacturing was the 
leading sector. The category construction was the smallest one with 1890.6 million US 
dollar from 1978 to December 2000. 
Figure 1. showed that the manufacturing sector grew exceptionally rapidly in the 
period 1990-93 to period 1994-1997. A number of industries expanded at an average 
annual growth rate 30% or above. These industries including garments, footwear, 
furniture, porcelain, glass, fabricated metal products, measuring equipment and other 
manufacturing, which include toys and sports goods.  
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Figure 1. also showed sharp degradation on manufacturing sectors in the period 
1994-97 to period 1998-2000. This declining led primarily by a severe slow-down in the 
textile, wood and paper sub-sectors. The slowdown in other sectors such as fabricated 
metal, machinery and transport equipment sub-sector and in the non-metallic mineral 
sub-sector also indicated a cause of the declining in manufacturing sectors. Only food and 
basic metal sub-sectors maintained their previous growth rates.  
Figure 1. 
Trend of Investment Project Approval by Sector 1978-2000, 
in millions US$
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Source: Indicator Economy Bulletin Statistic, BPS, Jakarta, 1980-2000; calculations based on data from indicator Economy, various 
issues. Excluding oil, insurance and banking sectors 
 
Foreign Investment by Country Origin 
The category country contains about 32 countries, 5 subcategories of continent 
and 1 subcategory of joint countries. Japan according to the data from Indikator Ekonomi 
(Indicator Economic) the leading country with a total investment of 31199.5 millions US 
dollar from January 1, 1978 to 2000. With a total investment of 30229 millions US dollar 
and 13331.9 billions US dollar, the United Kingdom and Hong Kong were respectively 
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the number two and three investors. The average investment in million US dollar per year 
for Japan was around 1300 millions US dollar, for the United Kingdom 1259.6 and Hong 
Kong 555.5 millions US dollar. Whereas Japan has a share of 9.4% of the total 
investment from 1978 to 2000, the United Kingdom has a share of 9.1% and Hong Kong 
around 4%. With two of the four so called New Industrializing Countries (NIC), Japan, 
South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan, in the top three of foreign investors in Indonesia, 
the New Industrializing Countries with good reason could be said to be the “emerging 
dragons”. Figure 2. showed the rapid investment growth in Indonesia from Asian 
Countries, especially in the period of 1990-93 to 1994-97, lead by NICs.  
In addition, that Japan has become one of the main direct investors in Indonesia is 
not very surprising because Japan has long been a major trading nation as well as a one of 
the main direct investors in the USA, Western Europe, China, and the South-East Asian 
region. (Andrea Harrisson, Ertugrul Dalkiran, Ena Elsey, International Business, p. 176).  
The USA has a total investment of only 8895.3 million US dollar from 1978 to 
2000. In addition, if the criteria include the oil sector we could not say that Japan was the 
leading investor in Indonesia because oil sector was the main sectors for investors from 
the USA. The question which country really was the number one investor, the USA or 
Japan, could not be answered by looking at the figures from indicator economic because 
the data provided by the Investment Coordinating Board exclude the oil sector.  
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Figure 2. 
Trend of Investment Project Approval by Country of Origin 
1978-2001, in millions US$
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Source: Indicator Economy Bulletin Statistic, BPS, Jakarta, 1980-2000; calculations based on data from indicator Economy, various   
issues. Excluding oil, insurance and banking sectors 
 
Foreign Investment by Location 
In Indicator Economic the locations were grouped according to the area or island. 
These categories were divided again in provinces. The regions in West Java, Special 
Region of Jakarta and East Java with respectively 59808.4; 32737.3 and 30124.7 million 
US dollar from 1978 to December 2000 attract the most investment projects. West Java, 
the number one location, has a share of 17.3% of the total investment whereas the special 
Region of Jakarta and East Java have a share of 9.5% and 8.7% of the total investment. 
The average investment per year is 2600.4 million US dollar for West Java, 1423.4 
million US dollar for the Special Region of Jakarta and 1309.8 million US dollar per year 
for East Java. 
In the category location one of the important factors besides a liberal policy was 
the infrastructure of a region. For both domestic and foreign investors the infrastructure 
was one of the criteria when deciding to invest or not. In regions with a less adequate 
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infrastructure the investment was usually lower than in regions with an adequate 
infrastructure. A good example was Southeast Sulawesi, the location with the lowest total 
investment (about 168 million US dollar from 1978 to 2000). Another example was East 
Indonesia where infrastructure also played an important role.  
Figure 3 showed that investment into Java increased gradually in the period 1990-
1993 to period 1994-1997 compared with other regions. At this period many of medium 
and large scale manufacturing industries were heavily concentrated in Java and Jakarta in 
particular. This happened because in this region good physical infrastructure was 
available and also the government offered special incentives to investors. By 1997 this 
region has increased their share of manufacturing employment and value added more 
than half of the country’s total.  
Figure 3. 
Trend of Investment Project Approval by Location 1978-2000, 
in millions US$
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Chapter IV 
Empirical Estimation of the FDI and GDP Growth Model 
 
The decision by foreigners to invest in a given country depends on a wide range 
of factors in the host country. Among the major ones were: the availability and cost of 
natural and human resources; adequacy of infrastructure and support facilities; market 
size; trade policies and other policies that affect macroeconomic stability; economic 
growth and level of development; and political stability12. The importance attached to 
each of these factors depends on the type of investment and the motivations or strategy of 
investors. 
Relative costs influence location decisions, but low direct labor costs were not  as 
much important as was commonly believed. In fact, the importance of low-cost unskilled 
labor in location decisions has declined in recent years and greater emphasis now has 
placed on skills and the trainability of workers. 
Moreover, in many industries, direct labor costs now account for only 10 to 15 
percent of manufacturing costs, and the share was even smaller in some industries. In 
contrast, because of white collar and supervisory roles, labor costs have been rising in the 
more developed countries; it has become increasingly attractive to invest in countries that 
offer low-wage high technology skills pool of labor. As multinationals transfer more 
sophisticated production lines to developing countries, the availability and cost of skilled 
labor become more important. 
                                                 
12 See the detail about factors involved in the FDI decision in International business, Andrew Harrison, 
Ertugrul Dalkarin and Ena Elsey, p. 256, 2000 
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Market size was also significant in affecting location decisions. Larger economies 
have attracted the bulk of FDI. This was because of the potential of local sales. In small 
economies, FDI usually concentrates on production for export. 
The role of previous investor was also another important factor in determining 
foreign investment inflows. There was somewhat of a “herd effect” with potential 
investors following where others are already operating successfully (Marios B. Obwona, 
1996). Further, as more firms invest in a country, synergies and linkages would develop 
among them. 
Costs were also affected by adequacy of infrastructure facilities and the supply of 
utilities. Unreliable transport and telecommunication services and insufficient power or 
water supply addition, the existence of efficient financial and other support facilities, 
which could cater the diversified needs of investors, was also necessary.  
The host country’s policies with respect to restricting or welcoming FDI would 
obviously also affect the magnitude and character of FDI. Not only would the policies 
have direct effect on FDI, but they would also affect whether the foreign firm wishes to 
export or license instead of having a direct production investment in the foreign country. 
Finally, the importance of political stability in creating a climate of confidence for 
investors could not be underestimated. Political instability, whether perceived or real, 
constitutes a serious different for FDI as it created uncertainties and increased risks and 
hence costs. 
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Following the model that has been used by Marios B. Obwona in the case of 
Uganda, in order to determine relationship between above factors and FDI in Indonesia, 
we have specified a model as follows13:  
 
Model specification 
Based on the Indonesian situation and availability of consistent data series, the 
following model was specified: 
 
FDI determinants equation 
1. FDI = a11 + a12 GDP + a13 GE  + a14 FD + a15 INF  + a16 DSR + a17 ER + a18 WF  +       
a19  NR + a20 PS + a21 GP +  u1 
Where:  
FDI  =  Real Foreign Direct Investment, 
GDP =  Real Gross Domestic Product,  
GE  =  Real Government Expenditure in Transportation,  
 Telecommunication and Education as proportion of GDP 
FD  =  Foreign Debt as a proportion of GDP 
INF  =  Inflation Rate was data GDP deflator 1995 = 100, 
DSR =  Domestic Saving Rate as a proportion of GDP 
ER =  Exchange Rate  
LF =  Labor Force 
TB =  Real Trade Balance 
                                                 
13 The model was modification from Model that has already been used by Marios B. Obwona. The 
modification is adjustable with Indonesia investment condition. 
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GP =  Government Policies used dummy variables, 1 for liberal policy, 0  
    for restrictive policy 
FDI (-1)  =  Real Foreign Direct Investment in the previous years. 
a1 =  stochastic disturbance terms. 
Based on the history and trend od FDI in the previous chapter the hypotheses below 
could be advanced concerning factors that have affected FDI inflows to Indonesia. 
H1: GDP, GE and DSR have positive relationship with FDI. 
The variable GDP stand for market size hypothesis. The market size stresses the necessity 
of large market size for efficient utilization of resources and exploitation of economies of 
scale. As the market size grows to some critical value, the hypothesis asserts that FDI 
would start and increase thereafter, with the expansion of the market size (Scarpelanda 
and Mauer, 1969; Torrisi, 1995). Moreover, GDP could be used to capture the influence 
of proven economic performance. The higher the value of GDP implies, in addition to 
greater domestic market, the better the infrastructure and hence provides greater incentive 
for FDI. In addition, the variable of GE above only covered expenditure in the field of 
infrastructure, transportation, telecommunication and education. According to Dunning, 
Inadequate infrastructure such as transportation and communication facilities, and 
perhaps most important of all, a poorly educated, trained or motivated labor force was 
insufficient to attract FDI. So our assumption was in order to attract more FDI, 
government should spend more in the areas of infrastructure and education. DSR 
represent a willingness to forgo present consumption in favor of investment in future 
production capacity and future consumption.    
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H2: ER, INF, FD and TB have negative relationship with FDI.  
All of these variables are reflection of macroeconomic stability. ER, INF, FD and TB 
capture some structural characteristics of the economy and are related to economic policy, 
which can be adjusted by policy makers in order to make FDI more attractive. Exchange 
rate instability increases a firm’s foreign exchange exposure and a falling currency might 
severely reduce the value of repatriated profits. The Inflation rate represents the cost of 
the latter in Indonesia fuels inflation. Inflation raises production costs and puts pressure 
on a firm either to raise its prices or to reduce its profit margins. Inflation also makes 
investors difficult to estimate the price of along-term contract. The high debt service 
overhang describes both the structure of the economy and political effects. 
To analyze the relationship between trade and FDI is actually rather complex and 
there are diverse predictions about this relationship (see Torrisi, 1985; Tsai, 1994). 
Taking in the Fry’s view (1983), with his argument of the two-gap model, he said that 
foreign exchange was one of the key constraints on economic growth in developing 
countries; it was not difficult to understand the relation between trade balance and FDI. 
When a country faced growing trade deficits, it was expected to adopt more favorable 
policies to facilitate inflow of FDI. 
H3: LF has positive relationship with FDI. Even labor force, especially low-cost 
unskilled labor, was less important to attract foreign investment inflow to country 
(Dunning, 1996), but labor force still have important role to attract foreign investment.  
H4: GP has negative relationship with FDI. The government policies were important in 
order to provide the business environment as well as the general political and economic 
environment. Above all, investors like a stable political environment. This is probably 
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more important than whether a country is in the upturn or downturn of its economic cycle, 
since investors are more concerned about an economy’s future potential than its present 
state. But political stability is crucial. Wars and civil unrest are an obvious case where 
loss of life or destruction of property may result. Turbulent changes of government might 
also lead to volatility in the business environment, leading to the nationalization or 
confiscation of foreign assets. In this case we will use dummy variables to investigate the 
government role toward FDI in Indonesia. As we discuss in the previous chapter, 
Indonesia has implemented two kinds of investment policies, liberalization and restriction 
policies. For the liberal period we use 1 as a representative of liberal period, and for 
restrictive we use initial 0 as representative of restrictive period. 
H5: FDI in the previous year has positive relationship with FDI in the recent year. The 
effect of the other investors, which has already been operating successfully, has 
influenced the new potential investors to follow. Further, as more firms invest in a 
country, it means the more synergies and linkage develop among them. We call this as 
herd effect. 
 
Growth equation 
2. GDPGR = a21 + a22 FDI + a23 GDS + a24 EG + a25 OCF + u2  
Where: 
GDPGR =  Real Annual Growth Rate of GDP,  
FDI  =  Real Foreign Direct Investment, 
GDS  =  Gross Domestic Savings as proportion of GDP,  
EG  =  Rate of Growth of Real Exports,  
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OCF  =  Other Capital Inflows, 
a2 =  stochastic disturbance terms 
Following the equation (2), four hypotheses could be advanced, concerning the effect of 
FDI to GDP growth. 
H6: FDI has positive relationship with GDPGR. The impact of FDI on economic growth 
is one of the most controversial topics in development economics. According to the 
modernization hypothesis, FDI  promotes economic growth by providing external capital 
and through growth, spreads the benefits throughout the economy. Moreover, FDI usually 
brings with it advanced technology, and better management and organization. FDI is in 
fact, the other engine of growth in developing countries.  
H7: GDS has positive relationship with GDPGR. The variable GDS is so standard in a 
production function that it is unnecessary to repeat the rationale of including it the 
Harrod-Dommar equation theory of economic growth states simply that the rate of 
growth of GNP/GDP is determined jointly by the national saving ratio, and the national 
capital-output ratio. More specifically, it say that in the absence of government, the 
growth rate of national income will be directly or positively related to the saving ratio (i.e. 
the more an economy was able to save and invest, out of a given GNP/GDP, the greater 
would be the growth of that GNP/GDP).  
H8: EG has positive relationship with GDPGR. The variable of EG is also so standard in 
a production function that it is unnecessary to repeat the rational behind this. The higher 
export that reached by a country the higher national income (GDP) the country gains. 
H9: OCF has positive relationship with GDPGR. The more capital inflow the more 
capital government has to finance development.  
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Data sources and data processing  
Annual time series data for the variables of interest for the period 1971-2000 were 
used. All data used were annual, in domestic currency and expressed in real terms at 1996 
constant prices. Data on FDI, GDP growth and so on were gathered from a number of 
sources: the IMF, International Financial Statistic Yearbook, the ADB, Key Indicators of 
Developing Asian and Pacific Countries, Indonesia Investment Coordinating Board, 
Statistic Indonesia of the Republic of Indonesia. The data for the government policy 
variables on the restrictiveness of Indonesia’s FDI system were based on the historical 
policy on FDI in chapter two.  
In processing data all data nominal has been transfered to real value by dividing it 
with GDP deflator 1995=100 times 100. The data included in this process were GDP, 
DSR, FD, GE, TB, FDI, EG, and OCF. The rest of the data used original data (nominal 
data). Data like inflation were taken from data GDP deflator 1995=100 (data inflation = 
data GDP deflator 1995=100). In the case of Government Policies, we used dummy 
variable, with specification 1 for liberal policy (period 1971-1973 and 1987-2000) and 0 
for restrictive policy (period 1974-1986).  
 
Empirical result     
 Table 5 reports the empirical results using data during 30 years from 1971 – 2000. 
The ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation method for FDI determinants and Growth 
equation models has been used. 
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Table 2. FDI determinants and growth equation 
Explanatory variables FDI determinants Growth equation 
Constant 
 
GDP 
 
GE 
 
FD 
 
INF 
 
DSR 
 
ER 
 
LF 
 
TB 
 
GP 
 
FDI (-1) 
 
FDI 
 
GDS 
 
EG 
 
737.1087 
(2.8522) 
0.2342* 
(4.2452) 
-4.0405* 
(-4.8578) 
0.0564* 
(2.3976) 
2.8438* 
(2.0843) 
0.3362* 
(2.7275) 
-0.0979* 
(-3.5142) 
-0.0189* 
(-3.4767) 
-0.2479* 
(-2.2899) 
-6.4764 
(-0.1525) 
0.02846 
(0.2086) 
8.3548 
(10.9871) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0056 
(0.9323) 
0.0715* 
(3.0828) 
-0.00003* 
(-3.4882) 
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OCF -0.0388* 
(-3.3225) 
R2 
S.E. of Regression 
Durbin Watson Stat 
0.9019 
32.8059 
2.8035 
0.8059 
1.9236 
2.1639 
Note:  The numbers in parenthesis are asymptotic t-statistic;  
* Indicates significance at 5 percent level 
 
FDI determinants equation result 
Based on empirical result in table 5, the regression analysis shows that GDP, DSR, 
FD, INF, FDI (-1) has positive relationship with FDI inflow vice versa ER, GE, LF, TB 
and GP has negative relationship with FDI in the case of Indonesia. Almost all variables 
have significant at 5 percent level except for variables GP and FDI (-1). In general those 
results above are quite good. The overall explanatory power of the model as indicated by 
R2 value is reasonably high. The Durbin Watson statistic is also quite good close to two. 
In addition, Durbin Watson Statistic functions as detection of autocorrelation 
disturbances between each variable of the model14.  
From table 5 above we find interesting cases on variables FD, GE, INF, and LF. 
For the variable of Foreign Debt, in the case of Indonesia it will not be surprising if 
Foreign Debt shows a positive relationship with FDI because commonly the donor 
countries also embody major investor for Indonesia, such as Japan and World Bank.  
In the case of Government Expenditure, as we mention in previous hypothesis, 
GE should have a positive relationship but the empirical result shows that GE has a 
negative relationship with FDI. This contradiction result happens because of some 
                                                 
14 The perfect value of Durbin Watson statistic was two. This means that between each variable there were 
not autocorrelation disturbances. (See the detail in Jack Johnston and John Dinardo, econometric methods, 
p.179) 
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possibilities. First, In the case of Indonesia, maybe the government expenditure is not so 
important. Investors consider other factors, which are more important, such as natural 
resources, government incentives, political stability, labor force and others. Second, 
maybe the government budget for investment in public facilities is so low that the GE 
every year has no impact toward foreign investment. There is no significant improvement 
in government budget every year (see data IMF). Third, maybe because in this paper 
variable GE  only covers some sectors, in government expenditure such as transportation, 
telecommunication, and education. So these three variables can not strongly represent 
variable of Government expenditure15.  
The result of Inflation variable also shows contradictory result with previous 
hypothesis and theory. The relation between inflation and investment should be negative, 
where the increasing of inflation will reduce FDI inflows. As we mention before, variable 
inflation is used as indication of macro economic stabilities. In this case, inflation can 
raise production costs and put pressure on a firm either to raise its prices or to reduce its 
profit margins. Inflation also makes investors difficult to estimate the price of a long-term 
contract. The high debt service overhang describes both the structure of the economy and 
political effects. If the relationship between FDI and inflation is positive this is not 
unreasonable. Positive relationship means that increasing of inflation would increase FDI 
inflow in Indonesia. So this result is dubious.  
The result of variable Labor Force is different from the hypothesis; LF has 
negative relationship with FDI. In Indonesian case, this result is quite reasonable, because 
                                                 
15 Government Expenditure, according data statistic, covered 13 items; general public services; defence; 
education; health; social security and walfare; hausing and community amenities; Economic services: 
agriculture, Industry, electricity, gas and water, transport and communication, other economic services; and 
others 
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majority of labor force in Indonesia generally is unskilled worker. According to Dunning, 
in the modern theory of FDI, labor force is not as much important as it is  commonly 
believed. Nowadays the importance of low-cost unskilled labor in location decisions has 
declined in recent years and greater emphasis has been placed on skills and the 
trainability of workers. From 1961 to 1990, only 8.1 percent students graduated from 
tertiary education, universities and academy16.  
 
Growth equation result 
As indicated in table 5 the regression analysis shows that FDI and EG have 
positive relationship with FDI inflow vice versa GDS and OCF has negative relationship 
against FDI in the case of Indonesia. Almost all variables have significant at 5 percent 
level except for variables FDI. In general, those results above are quite good. The overall 
explanatory power of the model as indicated by R2 value is reasonably high. The Durbin 
Watson statistic is also very good, almost perfect.  
The important thing in this empirical result is the relationship between GDPGR 
and FDI. The result shows that FDI is positively related to GDP growth, even the result 
shows insignificant at 5 percent significant level. In addition, the coefficient value of FDI 
is very small namely 0.0056. From the result we can interpret that every additional one 
point of FDI can increase 0.0056 point of GDP growth.  
From growth equation models, GDS and OCF show an opposite result with the 
previous hypothesis. Our hypothesis assumes that GDS has positive relationship with 
GDPGR but the result shows negative relationship. In the case of Indonesian this result is 
quite understandable because GDS in Indonesia is low, around 30 percent of GDP. On 
                                                 
16 Quoted from Hal Hill, p. 207, the original sources was BPS, Sensus Penduduk, 1961, 1971, 1980. 
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the other hand, government has also debt burden, so almost of GDS used by the 
government have to finance debt. Consumption in unproductive sector also includes one 
of the causes why GDS do not have positive relationship with GDP growth. Inequality of 
income distribution can not be looked down. Inequality of income distribution in 
Indonesia is very high, more than 50% concentrated in Jakarta, proprietary by 
conglomerates. 
The variable OCF also shows negative relationship with GDPGR. In the case of 
Indonesia this result could be understandable, because many of foreign loans distribute to 
inappropriate objects, especially in President Soeharto’s era. According to Sumitro, 
around 40 percent of foreign debt from donor countries have gone useless17.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 Sumitro mentioned in the local newspaper (Kompas, 1998) that around 40 development lending has 
corrupted.   
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Chapter V 
Conclusion 
 
Throughout Indonesia’s economic development, FDI has played an important role 
in rehabilitating Indonesia’s economy especially at the beginning of 196718. Both 
economic theory and recent empirical evidence suggest that FDI has beneficial impact on 
developing host country. Even its quantitative insignificance, case study evidences show 
that FDI has had a significant impact on Indonesia economic growth. The historical 
overview suggest that in the initial period of implementing market oriented system, FDI 
has had important role in restoring economic problem by spinning out domestic 
investment, filling lack of capital, accelerating industrialization and increasing GDP 
growth. Period 1994 to 1997 has showed that manufacturing sector has grown very 
rapidly more than four times.  
The 1997 economic crisis accompanied with political and social dispute has 
decreased foreign investment. This experience suggests that stable business environment 
as well as politic and economic stabilization also has very important role to attract FDI 
inflows. The general message from our study and empirical findings is, from the 
viewpoint of attracting investment, the macroeconomic and political stability are more 
important than level of the incentives themselves19. This view has important consequence 
for macroeconomic policy making and for the design of reform programs to promote 
investment. Besides that, good governance, building better legal framework and 
                                                 
18 In order to rehaabilitate the economy the government moved decisively on restoring macroeconomic 
stability and introduced market-oriented reforms, Donald J. Lecraw, Indonesia: the critical role of 
government, p. 322.  
19 Even the government was promising many incentives but if the macroeconomic and political stability did 
not support the investment climate, most investor still consider doing an investment.  
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eliminating corruption in bureaucratic institution are not less important. The 1997 crisis 
has give lesson to Indonesia about how important development of better legal framework 
in globalization era is. 
However, economic crisis does not make the government surrender. The 
government should continue their efforts to attract and accelerate the flow of FDI through 
policy liberalization and introduction of new measure and mechanisms. Some of these 
measures include, among other things, as follows: 
a. Creating a climate favorable to investment, which requires establishing a partnership 
between the government and the private sector on the basis of greater transparency in 
public administration and strong intermediate organization such as chambers of 
commerce, business councils, professionals and associations, which could engage the 
state in a regular dialogue. The state has a critical role to play, but government needs 
to encourage, stimulate, regulate, and complement the private sectors, rather than 
compete with it or attempt to displace, discourage, and exploit it. 
b. Maintaining economic and political stability, as a general precondition for increased 
FDI, and intensifying regional cooperation. With greater regional integration, each 
individual country would have an increased market for particular goods. 
Overall, Indonesia has done a remarkable job in attracting FDI given the obstacles 
of history, context and natural hindrance. A continued process of foreign investment 
liberalization is thus necessary to realize the full potential of foreign investment and 
allow foreign investment to complement local effort in accelerating the country’s 
development. The hope is a promising one as the restoration continues. 
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Appendixes I 
 
FDI Determinats Equation Result 
 
 
Dependent Variable: RFDI 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 02/03/02   Time: 02:36 
Sample(adjusted): 1976 2000 
Included observations: 25 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 737.1087 258.4327 2.852226 0.0128 
GDP 0.234268 0.055184 4.245226 0.0008 
DSR 0.336190 0.123257 2.727541 0.0163 
ER -0.097903 0.027860 -3.514161 0.0034 
RFD 0.056447 0.023543 2.397628 0.0310 
RGE -4.040469 0.831751 -4.857786 0.0003 
INF 2.843805 1.364402 2.084286 0.0559 
LF -0.018931 0.005445 -3.476686 0.0037 
RTB -0.247949 0.108275 -2.289983 0.0381 
GP -6.476433 42.48139 -0.152453 0.8810 
RFDI(-1) 0.028455 0.136432 0.208562 0.8378 
R-squared 0.942767     Mean dependent var 97.58046 
Adjusted R-squared 0.901886     S.D. dependent var 104.7341 
S.E. of regression 32.80599     Akaike info criterion 10.11928 
Sum squared resid 15067.27     Schwarz criterion 10.65559 
Log likelihood -115.4910     F-statistic 23.06139 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.803459     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000001 
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Appendixes II 
 
Growth Equation Result 
 
 
Dependent Variable: GDPGR 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 01/31/02   Time: 02:23 
Sample(adjusted): 1972 1999 
Included observations: 28 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 8.354752 0.760414 10.98711 0.0000 
RFDI 0.005593 0.006000 0.932267 0.3609 
ROCF -0.038828 0.011686 -3.322468 0.0030 
EG 0.071545 0.023208 3.082796 0.0053 
GDS -2.58E-05 7.39E-06 -3.488216 0.0020 
R-squared 0.834644     Mean dependent var 5.857143 
Adjusted R-squared 0.805886     S.D. dependent var 4.366067 
S.E. of regression 1.923617     Akaike info criterion 4.306725 
Sum squared resid 85.10699     Schwarz criterion 4.544618 
Log likelihood -55.29414     F-statistic 29.02340 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.163938     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
 
